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 1. Introduction 
China’s airline markets have attracted the attention of many major international carriers, but 
have largely failed to attract the attention of academics. Literature on China’s airline markets 
remains relatively sparse, owing to the country’s opacity in aviation policies and the 
limitations of data availability. The dramatic changes that took place in China’s airline 
industry in the past 20 years, from a period of strict regulation and control to being relatively 
uncontrolled and loosely supervised, resulted in chaotic and unexpected outcomes. Those 
within the industry had two opposing attitudes towards these changes: some applauded 
them and called for further reforms, while others resisted and demanded a return to 
regulation. This is also the case for the 2002 airline consolidations, which were controversial 
with regard to how to form an airline group and which carriers to include in each group. 
The complexity of China’s airline markets, increased by the government’s sometimes 
inconsistent policies, is difficult to comprehend for economists and researchers outside the 
industry. This paper seeks to document and describe events in the last decade in China’s 
airline markets, and to clarify some misunderstandings in regard to the 2002 airline 
consolidations that brought sweeping changes to China’s aviation markets. Some possible 
reasons for the 2002 consolidations are inferred through analysing the numbers and facts of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. We conclude that the consolidations may be a natural 
response to the changes that accompanied airline deregulation in China. 
2. China’s Civil Aviation History and Deregulation 
The development of China’s airline industry can be broken into three stages that accord with 
the evolution of China’s macroeconomic policy and the industry’s characteristics. China’s 
civil aviation history in the first two stages and up to the late 1990s has been well 
documented in Zhang (1998) and Chung (2003). In the following discussion, we will only 
briefly summarise the main features for these two stages. 
2.1. Stage 1: Civil Aviation under Central Planning 
Before 1980 China was politically and economically isolated from the outside world. The 
airline industry was a semi-military organisation under the dual leadership of the air force 
 and the State Council,
1
 engaging in only limited commercial operations (see China’s Civil 
Aviation Statistics 1949–2000 (2002)). New routes were launched primarily to suit political 
activities. The industry experienced losses from 1953 to 1978, even after taking into account 
the central government’s subsidies to the industry (see Zhang 1998, p.157). One reason for 
the persistent losses was that before 1980 only government officials at a certain high level 
were eligible to fly. This period is usually regarded as the first stage of the evolution of 
China’s airline industry. In this phase, civil aviation operated under a four-tier 
administration system: 
 The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) was the head,2 both as a 
government department and as an enterprise engaging in aviation business. 
 Each of the six regional civil aviation bureaus—Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, 
Guangzhou, Chengdu and Lanzhou (later relocated to Xian)—operated under the 
leadership of CAAC, which was in charge of and organised the aviation business of 
each region. Each of these bureaus engaged in airline operations in the name of 
CAAC in their own regions, which evolved into six trunk airlines. 
 Under the regional bureaus there were 23 provincial civil aviation bureaus, mainly 
engaged in airport management businesses and other local aviation activities. 
 78 civil aviation stations across the country, the fourth tier, were directly controlled 
by their provincial bureaus. 
As with many other industries, this four-tier system was typical during the period of the 
centrally planned economy, embodying a combination of government and enterprise 
functions. The market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s sought to separate these two 
functions, and this policy has guided the industry’s evolution since 1978. 
                                                 
1
 The State Council of China, namely the Central Government, is composed of the premier, vice-premiers, 
state councillors, ministers in charge of ministries and commissions, the auditor-general and the 
secretary-general. 
2
 CAAC was a government department under the leadership of the State Council, but most of the time it was 
controlled by the Central Military Committee. CAAC was regarded as an airline operator as well as a 
regulatory body until the establishment of the six trunk airlines. 
 2.2. Stage 2: Transition from Central Planning to Market Orientation with ongoing 
Reforms 
The second stage began in the late 1970s, when China was gradually moving away from its 
traditional centrally planned system. In the context of the ―open door‖ policy adopted by the 
Chinese government, the airline industry started to embrace international rules and practices. 
CAAC was separated from the air force and in 1980 came under the direct supervision of the 
State Council. Within CAAC, the six regional civil aviation bureaus became ―half 
corporatised‖ with the aim of making them financially independent.3 
To encourage operating efficiency and profitability, in 1987 the State Council ratified the 
―Report on Civil Aviation Reform Measures and Implementation‖, and separated CAAC’s 
government, administrative and regulatory roles from the direct management of the 
day-to-day operations of commercial airlines and airports. Following the ratification of this 
report, between 1987 and 1991 six trunk airlines based in the regional capital cities emerged: 
Air China (Beijing), China Eastern (Shanghai), China Northwest (Xi’an), China Northern 
(Shenyang), China Southwest (Chengdu) and China Southern (Guangzhou). CAAC was the 
nominal owner of these airlines, in the name of the state. Accompanying these reforms was 
growth in the number of regional airlines, which were usually established by local 
governments or jointly with CAAC in a bid to support the local economy. Most began with 
only two or three planes and were based in their provincial capitals, from where they 
provided services to gateway cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.  
Both the regional and trunk airlines were tightly regulated by CAAC in every aspect of air 
services provision, market entry, route entry, frequency and pricing, with only limited 
competition between the regional airlines and the trunk airlines on a small number of routes. 
Until 1996, Chinese airlines competed against each other through standards of service and 
their safety record, rather than through competitive pricing. In fact, passengers had no strong 
brand identity awareness before the mid-1990s, as many airlines had only recently been 
established and were effectively indistinguishable because of the tight regulation by CAAC. 
In such a controlled environment, it was highly unlikely that competitiveness would be 
fostered. 
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 The first step towards a market economy in China in the 1980s was to make the state-owned enterprises 
―self-responsible for losses and extra-profit retention‖, i.e., recording profits and losses independently (see 
Zhang 1998). 
 2.3. Stage 3: Deregulation, Privatisation and Consolidation 
The year 1997 marked the start of the third stage of the development of China’s airline 
industry. This stage, which continues to the present, provides a landmark of deregulation, 
privatisation and consolidation. From 1997 on, airlines experienced a period of unexpected 
shocks from both home and abroad, with increasing challenges from aggressive international 
airlines, further deregulation demands from foreign governments, and a worldwide trend 
towards airline alliances. Passengers with a high level of awareness of their consumer rights 
demanded better services and prices. Profits were no longer guaranteed and fluctuations in 
revenue were unavoidable. Government policies on the airline industry in this era were at 
times inconsistent and promoted controversy, as can be seen in the following sections. 
2.3.1. Deregulation in Airfares 
The first sign of price relaxation occurred in 1992, when the State Council allowed the price 
of airfares to vary within a range of 10% of the set price. However, in practice, all airlines 
still adopted the same price, and changed their prices simultaneously under the supervision 
of CAAC. From 1 July 1997, price discrimination on foreign passengers was eliminated and 
the same price applied to all passengers who purchased their tickets in China. In November 
1997, CAAC promulgated the policy of ―one class with multiple discounts‖,4 encouraging 
airlines to adopt a price discrimination strategy in an attempt to attract more passengers in 
order to make full use of their capacity. This policy marked the beginning of the deregulation 
of air prices. Repeated price wars between airlines followed. To make their load factors look 
good and to snatch greater market shares, airlines sold their seats at low prices without 
considering their costs. The destructive dogfight led to a heavy loss of 3.5 billion Chinese 
yuan (US$0.44 billion) for the whole industry in 1998 (International Finance Daily, 
17/04/2003). 
On 8 May 1998, CAAC issued ―The Decision to Enforce Supervision and Restore Order in 
the Air Market‖, prohibiting discounts from falling below 20% of the normal price. As there 
were no penalties, many airlines disregarded this command and the price wars continued. 
CAAC’s role as a regulator and coordinator, which involved the issuing of policies and 
pricing, was being severely challenged. Thus, in February 1999 it introduced a stronger 
policy that had the intent of immediately halting any discounts on any route. It included the 
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 The airlines used to simply set three classes in their flights: first, business and economy. The adoption of 
the yield management system allows one class (e.g., economy class) with many sub-classes, offering 
different discounts to passengers at different time points. 
 harsh penalty of expulsion from routes where violators discounted airfares. Several 
violations were detected on some routes and the violators were punished,
5
 but when too 
many airlines continued discounting, CAAC could do nothing because it was too difficult to 
penalise them all. At the same time, consumers strongly opposed any tightening of control 
over prices, and the airlines did not want to be deprived of their pricing freedoms once they 
had been acquired (Li 2001). 
―Revenue pooling‖ was CAAC’s last-ditch attempt to curb destructive competition. From 1 
April 2000, CAAC decided that the airlines’ revenues on each of 108 routes where 
competition had been relatively fierce should be aggregated and reallocated at the settlement 
centre of CAAC, taking into account each airline’s seats actually offered and passengers 
actually carried.
6
 Airlines that did not want to join this scheme would be expelled from these 
routes. The 108 routes accounted for 11% of the total domestic routes but carried 50.5% of 
domestic passengers. Although this remedy could stop the declines in the airlines’ revenues, 
its defect was obvious: it gave no impetus to airlines to do more to attract passengers. Many 
people questioned whether this method had violated the existing Price Law by eliminating 
competition.
7
 Criticisms were overwhelming from consumers, who denounced CAAC as a 
protector of airlines, not a real regulator, as it compromised the interests of both airlines and 
consumers ((for example, see Huang (2000) questioning this policy in Beijing Morning 
News, 19/04/2000). 
Despite CAAC’s efforts, not every airline was satisfied with the revenue-pooling remedy. 
Ambitious airlines with competitive advantages could gain larger revenues if they were 
allowed to compete freely. This policy forced all the airlines to work together instead of 
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 For example, Hainan Airlines was expelled from several routes for one or two scheduled seasons when 
found to be selling heavily discounted prices on these routes. 
6
 Under this policy, each airline was required to put its sales revenue (number of passengers carried times 
80% of the normal fares) into a pool for reallocation. Even if an airline sold a ticket at a price of 70% of the 
normal fare, it had to put an amount of 80% of the normal fare into the revenue pool. In the reallocation, 
airlines with larger aircraft and thus with more seats could be reallocated more, even if these seats were 
unsold. 
7
 Although price-fixing activities could be caught by the 1997 Price Law which in Section 14 (1) prohibited 
price collusion, this clause has never been enforced on the airlines in China by price control administrations, 
in part, we suspect, because Section 18 of the Price Law allows the government to exercise pricing power in 
certain areas, such as a natural monopoly and public service sectors, although this section is not clearly 
spelled out. 
 competing against each other, which meant that the competitive ones had to sacrifice their 
best interests to accommodate the weaker ones. Another downside of this policy was that 
undiscounted prices struck a heavy blow to the booming tourism industry, which was 
especially important for provinces such as Hainan. 
CAAC faced a dilemma. At a time when China was ready to step into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) to embrace the market economy, CAAC’s re-regulation measure was 
bound to be short-lived. A mere one month later, CAAC allowed group discounts on tourist 
routes from Hainan in May 2000. In August of the same year, routes to small communities in 
regional areas were allowed to apply discounts of not more than 10%. At the beginning of 
2001, CAAC permitted flexible prices on more routes, but only if the amount of money 
actually paid by passengers was entered on the ticket and the discounts were within the range 
set by CAAC. However, the discount range in most cases was simply ignored. Although the 
―revenue pooling‖ agreement was signed again by most of the airlines effective on 112 
routes in March 2001, for many airlines, the agreement was only a paper one. Airlines 
closely matched their rivals' ticket prices, with no reference to CAAC’s policy. 
After finding that airlines could circumvent the revenue-pooling policy by secretly selling 
more discount tickets to increase their revenue, CAAC realised that it could no longer 
exercise any strong influence on pricing. As a result, it formally abandoned its 
revenue-pooling policy in November 2002. From then it was up to the airlines to decide 
whether they would pool revenue on any given route bilaterally or multilaterally, or not pool 
at all. 
But as a regulatory body, CAAC was still responsible for regulating air prices. Working with 
the National Development and Reform Commission, ―The Scheme of Domestic Airfare 
Reform‖ (2004 Airfare Reform Scheme hereafter) was drafted to set benchmark prices and 
establish a pricing mechanism. After a hearing on 15 July 2003, which included consumers 
and airlines as well as other relevant parties, this scheme was finally promulgated in April 
2004. The benchmark price in the domestic market was set at 0.75 Chinese yuan (US$0.094) 
per kilometre, taking airlines’ average cost, market demand and the resources of consumers 
into account. For the first time airlines were given the right to decide the price at a range 25% 
higher (price ceiling) and 45% lower than the benchmark price (price floor). Again, the 
range limit was ignored as 70% discounts on many routes were common both before and 
after the release of this scheme. 
 In fact, since the collapse of the revenue-pooling policy, CAAC has accepted a hands-off 
approach to price regulation and has turned a blind eye to the price wars. All it can do now is 
remind airlines of the scheme after any price war. The airlines do not strictly abide by 
regulations that have no clear and effective punishment measures. Thus, it can be seen that 
the pricing of air fares in China’s domestic market has, de facto, been deregulated, without a 
formal Deregulation Act such as in the US. 
Recall the US airline deregulation experience that was detailed by Pickrell (1991), from 
which we can make an interesting comparison with China’s deregulation. Before the formal 
deregulation marked by the enactment of the 1978 Deregulation Act, the Civil Aeronautic 
Board (CAB), the regulatory body, like CAAC, was under mounting pressure from 
academics and the public, who called for relaxation of its controls over fares and airline 
entry. Restrictions imposed on charter flights were the first to be lifted, enabling them to 
provide low-fare services from 1975. In response to the threat from charter flights, the 
regulated airlines successfully applied for permission to discount coach fares up to 45%. 
Later, a deeper discount (70%) was allowed by CAB. In 1978, before the formal 
deregulation, virtually all domestic routes experienced discount fares offered by the 
regulated airlines. 
According to Pickrell, due to developments in the policies of fare flexibility, and more 
liberal entry and exit that had developed over the previous year, the Airline Deregulation Act 
simply codified them. The Act allowed deregulation measures to be phased in, and as a result 
airlines had full freedom to enter any market in 1981, and the full freedom to set fares in 
1982. It seems that after years of unplanned deregulation before the passage of the Act, US 
deregulation moved on in a very planned and organised way as a result of the Deregulation 
Act. In contrast, China’s deregulation of airfares under the 2004 Airfare Reform Scheme did 
not seem to have any intention to codify the de facto airfare flexibility, nor to offer a 
guideline for the future development of the airline industry. This shows that CAAC was not 
determined to grant full pricing freedom at this stage. 
2.3.2. Deregulation of Entry and Exit 
The 1996 ―Regulation on Operation of Chinese Civil Aviation Domestic Routes and 
Flights‖8 requires that an application for entry to and exit from a route, and for an increase in 
the number of flights on any route, be submitted in advance to CAAC for approval. There are 
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 This regulation was issued by CAAC on 18/11/1996. 
 many indications that CAAC has gradually loosened the criteria for entry and exit in the 
domestic market since 2000. As noted by the deputy director of CAAC in the Beijing Youth 
Daily (2/11/ 2004), it has simplified its approval procedures and frequently encourages the 
opening of new routes. CAAC used to meet every year to coordinate route entry among 
airlines, but from 2004 these meetings were cancelled unless necessary, because the 
applications were rarely rejected. Since 2004, airlines with better safety records, higher 
on-time performance rates and service quality appraisals have been awarded priority in 
opening new routes and expanding frequencies. With the purpose of developing hub airports 
in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, opening routes to these cities was encouraged. The 
1996 regulation allows CAAC to retain the right not to let a carrier stop serving a route, but it 
seldom uses this right if the airline cannot bear the loss incurred by serving that route. 
More freedoms were formally granted to the carriers in the ―Regulation on the Operation on 
the Domestic Routes‖, which came into effect from March 2006. According to this 
regulation, except for some routes with high traffic volume and routes linking the busy 
airports, airlines may begin and stop services on a route without prior CAAC approval. A 
simple notification to the regional civil aviation bureau prior to their action is sufficient 
(called the registry-for-record system). This opens the door for the airlines to enter most 
domestic markets, without CAAC conducting a case-by-case review of the carriers’ 
applications. Currently, flights in and out of the eight busiest airports—Beijing, Shanghai's 
Pudong and Hongqiao, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Kunming and Dalian—and flights 
operating on the top 15 busiest routes in terms of passenger volume, are still under control. 
Entry and exit to them still needs prior approval. 
2.3.3. Privatisation 
Because of communist ideology and its traditional conservatism, the airline industry 
shunned privatisation before the mid-1990s. Foreign investment was not allowed in China’s 
airline industry until 1994, when CAAC and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation issued the ―Notice on Policies Concerning Foreign Investment in Civil 
Aviation‖. This policy allowed foreign investors to invest in existing airlines, to construct 
airports and to establish general aviation enterprises (aviation enterprises that do not carry 
commercial passengers and cargo) with Chinese partners. The foreign investment in airlines 
was not allowed to exceed 35% of the registered capital with not more than 25% voting 
rights, while the cap for foreign investment in airports was 49% of the registered capital. The 
American Aviation Investment Fund acquired 25% of the total number of shares in Hainan 
 Airlines in 1995, but CAAC denied that foreign investments would be given a green light to 
be involved in ―core‖ aviation business (Le 1997). This more or less reflected CAAC’s 
conservative attitude with regard to the openness of ownership of airlines. In 1997 the listing 
of China Eastern Airlines Co. Ltd on the New York, Hong Kong and Shanghai stock 
exchanges marked the first step of privatisation. Direct investment was now allowed in core 
aviation businesses, suggesting that 1997 could be seen as the start of the new stage. 
Lo (2003) documents the lengthy preparation and negotiation process with CAAC and other 
government agencies over the restructuring issues underlying the public listing of China 
Eastern. The restructuring to become a listed company required that the assets and liabilities 
between the new company and the China Eastern Group be defined and assessed. One 
interviewee told Lo that CAAC did not want China Eastern to be publicly listed as it did not 
want to lose control over it. Therefore, negotiations with CAAC were very difficult. This is 
understandable in China’s context, for the central authorities have always sought to control 
the affairs of local governments and state-owned firms, while the latter use every means to 
resist in their attempt to gain more independence and self-managing rights. CAAC was no 
exception. Therefore, CAAC’s gradual loss of control over prices and the airlines’ defiance 
of its authority from time to time, as mentioned earlier, are not surprising. The interests of 
the firms and the central government (and also the interests of the local governments and the 
central government) do not always coincide. Sometimes it was pressure from local 
governments and enterprises that drove the central government to go further in reforming or 
adopting a new policy. 
But once the tap was turned on, it was impossible to stop. As a capital-intensive industry, 
China’s airlines have found that the stock market is more cost-effective than bank loans in 
raising money to buy planes. Loans were previously their only avenue for raising funds, but 
these were too expensive to allow the purchase of new planes. 
The process of privatisation and diversification in ownership of the once strictly state-owned 
airlines continued after 1997. Several months after the public listing of China Eastern, China 
Southern Airlines Co. Ltd succeeded in listing its shares on both the New York and Hong 
Kong stock exchanges. Its shares were also listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2003. 
The Southeast Asian financial crisis postponed Air China’s public listing (Zhang 2002), but 
this flag carrier finally listed its shares in Hong Kong and London at the end of 2004. Before 
the consolidations in 2002, many regional airlines had been partly privatised, and some, such 
 as Hainan Airlines, Shanghai Airlines and Shenzhen Airlines, had listed their shares 
domestically and/or overseas. 
Meanwhile, privatisation and more direct foreign investment in other aviation-related areas 
such as airport infrastructure, aircraft maintenance and ground handling services have 
gradually restructured China’s companies in these areas. One of China’s most important 
gateways—Shanghai—had its airport managing company, Shanghai International Airport 
Co. Ltd, listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1998. Many other small airports, such as 
Xiamen and Shenzhen, followed. Guangzhou Baiyun Airport Co. Ltd also went public in 
2003. Since 1989 a number of joint venture facilities in maintenance, repair and overhaul 
(MRO), such as AMECO,
9
 GAMECO,
10
 TAECO,
11
 STARCO,
12
 and many other smaller 
MRO joint ventures have been established, serving domestic and international airlines. In 
October 2006, Boeing Shanghai Aviation Services Co. Ltd was established and incorporated 
by the Boeing Company, Shanghai Airport Co. Ltd. and Shanghai Airlines Co. Ltd, aiming 
to establish a world-class MRO facility to offer modification, maintenance, repair and 
overhaul services. In the service area, Beijing Aviation Ground Services Co., Ltd (BGS), 
owned and controlled by Beijing Capital International Airport Company Limited and 
Singapore Airport Terminal Services (Private) Limited (SATS), is the first joint venture 
company to provide ground-handling services for airline clients. 
China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 opened a new page in the annals of the 
airline industry’s reform and deregulation. To accelerate and boost the industry’s 
development by creating a greater number of large airline corporations and airports, the 
―New Regulations for Foreign Investment in the Civil Aviation Industry‖13 came into 
effect on 1 August 2002, replacing the ―Notice on Policies Concerning Foreign Investment 
in Civil Aviation‖ (1994). Foreign investment is now encouraged in all domestic airlines 
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 Aircraft Maintenance and Engineering Corporation (Beijing), established by Air China and Lufthansa 
Airlines. 
10
 Guangzhou Aircraft Maintenance Engineering Co., Ltd, established by China Southern Airlines, South 
China International Aircraft Engineering Co., Ltd and Hutchinson Aircraft. 
11
 Taikoo (Xiamen) Aircraft Engineering Co., Ltd, a subsidiary of Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering 
(TAECO) 
12
 Shanghai Technologies Aerospace Co., Ltd, established by Singapore Technologies Aerospace and China 
Eastern Airlines. 
13
 Jointly promulgated by the General Administration of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, and the State Development Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of China. 
 and general aviation enterprises, as well as in air transport-related projects in refuelling, 
aircraft maintenance, air freight and storage, etc, but not in the air traffic control system or 
in projects related to national security. The maximum share that can be jointly held by 
foreigners is limited to 49% in airport investment; this threshold can be lifted if the 
Chinese investment party dominates.
14
 The cap of 35% of registered capital investment 
from foreign companies in airlines has been raised to 49% in the new regulation. However, 
no single foreign company can own more than 25%. Despite this, the new ownership 
regulation is much less restrictive than the regulation in many other countries, including 
the US and Canada, where there is still a 25% voting right restriction on foreigners. 
Meanwhile, the door to domestic private investors has been opened as well, and a 
regulation allowing such investors to enter the civil aviation industry took effect as of 15 
August 2005, with the purpose of achieving a trade-off between the utilisation of foreign 
capital and domestic capital (Securities Times, 02/08/2005). Taking three years to draft, the 
―Regulation on Domestic Investment on Civil Aviation‖ (CCAR-209, effective from 15 
August 2005) shows the government’s resolve to break the monopoly in this industry. This 
regulation also imposes restrictions on airport and aviation oil companies in gaining stakes 
in airlines, as they are still operating as monopolies and such ownership might be likely to 
result in unfair competition. It also clearly lists the airlines and airports that CAAC will 
continue to own or hold (a majority stake) and that will therefore be controlled by the state. 
The big three airlines and provincial capital airports as well as nine coastal airports are on 
the list. 
The relaxation of the regulation on investment in civil aviation has encouraged the 
establishment of private airlines. More than 10 private airlines have been licensed since 
2005. Most of them positioned themselves as low cost airlines. However, they have not 
posed any serious threat to the existing airlines so far because of their relatively small 
capacity. 
2.4. Reforms and Deregulation are Still Progressing 
On 3 March 2002, the State Council ratified the ―Civil Aviation System Reform 
Programme‖, which has the following main goals: 
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 For example, foreigners can jointly hold a stake of 60% with no individual more than 40%, and the 
Chinese party holding the rest (40%) will dominate. 
  Restructure of the civil aviation administration system from four tiers to two tiers, 
i.e., CAAC and seven regional civil aviation bureaus (North China, Northeast China, 
East China, Central and South China, Southwest China, Northwest China and 
Xinjiang Urumqi). Provincial civil aviation bureaus were eliminated and replaced by 
26 provincial civil aviation safety supervision offices. The role of CAAC and the 
regional bureaus was clearly defined with a focus on safety management, aviation 
market management, macro-control,
15
 air traffic control management, and foreign 
relationships, with no interference in transport enterprises’ internal affairs.16 
 Restructure of the airlines and aviation services. Nine airlines were to be regrouped 
under the big three: Air China Group, China Eastern Group and China Southern 
Group; the Computer Information Centre and Accounting Centre under CAAC 
would be merged into a joint aviation information service centre; China Aviation Oil 
Corp and Aviation Supplies Import and Export Corp would be combined into a 
supply centre. These groups were established in October 2002 through this reform 
programme. 
 Transfer of the management rights of 93 airports to provincial governments, except 
for the Beijing Capital and Tibetan airports. Most of these airports were heavily in 
debt and were subsidised by the central government. After the completion of the 
transfer, the financial and operational burden passed to the provincial governments. 
This is one of the main reasons why the new aviation investment regulation 
encourages more private investment in airports. 
The core of this reform is to completely remove the hand of CAAC from the commercial 
operation of air transport enterprises and aviation-related companies. The major task is 
airline consolidations. All of these reforms can be regarded as a further move to deregulate 
the aviation industry. At the end of 2004, CAAC declared completion of all the tasks set by 
the 2002 Reform Programme. 
However, it might take time to judge whether the implementation of these reforms has been 
successful or not. Reforms have certainly not stopped since 2004. In early 2006, CAAC 
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 In China, macro-control usually means the use of government influence to contract or expand the rate of 
growth in the economy. 
16
 With the realisation of this goal at the end of 2005, CAAC and the regional bureaus now act purely as a 
government agency with no authority to intervene in the day-to-day operations of the airlines and airports. 
 issued ―CAAC Guidelines on Deepening the Civil Aviation Reform‖, in which some 
objectives and tasks in the next five years were proposed. Two objectives were noticeable. 
One is the removal of the control over operation rights on all domestic routes, which means 
that the registry-for-record system for entry and exit will apply for all the domestic routes by 
2010. Domestic airlines will not be required to go through the approval procedure and will 
only need to report the decision to fly on a certain route to CAAC. Another objective is to 
remove the price floor set up in the 2004 Airfare Reform Scheme, although this floor has had 
little effect on airlines’ pricing in reality.  
The guidelines also state that the government encourages China’s airline to engage in all 
forms of cooperation with foreign airlines including joining the international airline alliance. 
In fact, the codesharing restriction between China and the US has already been removed 
between China and the US in their 2004 air services agreement. Northwest, American and 
United Airlines have each operated code share flights with Chinese carriers in China’s 
domestic markets, extending their route network to Chinese inland cities. At the end of 
2007, China Southern became a member of Skyteam, and Air China and Shanghai Airlines 
joined Star Alliance. This not only implies an expanded network for Chinese airlines, but 
also means that more Chinese domestic points have been opened to other alliance members 
through codesharing. 
Looking back, CAAC did not function properly, at least to some extent in the first several 
years after initial deregulation. It has been blamed for the periodic aircraft accidents and the 
airfare wars because of its conservatism and inconsistent policies. Almost all upper echelon 
officials and airline managers are air force veterans who have been inculcated with a culture 
of suppressing innovation. In the past several decades CAAC built up a protective fortress 
around the airline industry within the ideology of a centrally planned economy. This led at 
times to blinkered and inconsistent policies. In one period it encouraged flexibility in prices, 
while in another it tightened price regulation. In one period it freely licensed airlines, while 
in another it supported the takeover of small airlines that undercut airfares and caused price 
wars. However, deregulation has been moving on. A clearer deregulation direction has 
emerged since the implementation of the 2002 Civil Aviation System Reform Programme, 
especially since the formulation of the 2006 ―CAAC Guidelines on Deepening the Civil 
Aviation Reform‖. The series of reforms in the third stage towards privatisation and a more 
deregulated environment where carriers enjoy more freedom are the result of the following 
forces. 
 First, major global economic powers and financial centres such as the US, Britain, Germany, 
Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore all possess advanced and powerful commercial airline 
systems to facilitate their economic growth. Given China’s rapid growth in GDP, the 
movement of goods and people needs an efficient air transport system. In turn, economic 
growth will be accelerated by efficient transport. Deregulation, privatisation and 
consolidation all came with a common purpose, namely to push the less efficient Chinese 
airlines to modernise in order to serve the growth economy. 
The same reason applies to the local governments that wish to have closer links to the rest of 
China and the world. They need money from various sources, including the government, and 
foreign and domestic private investors to upgrade their local airports. A clear-cut law 
relating to investment in these areas is essential. 
Second, in response to the increasing requests from the relatively efficient airlines that want 
more freedom to access domestic and international routes, simplifying entry and exit 
procedure is inevitable. 
Third, an increase in the power of consumers pushed CAAC to remove the minimum 
threshold imposed on airfares. As well, public pressure ensured that CAAC took no 
consistent and effective punishment measures against the carriers that violated the threshold. 
The benchmark prices that CAAC proposed were questioned by the press with a complaint 
that the purpose of such prices was to secure profits and that they gave carriers no incentive 
to lower costs. People were dissatisfied when they found that domestic airfares in countries 
such as the US were much cheaper over similar distances, even though American airlines 
have higher labour costs. 
Fourth, the emergence of substitute products for scheduled airline services, such as 
high-speed trains between metropolitan cities, gave a greater choice to passengers. Price 
then became an important factor in attracting passengers. 
Finally, the high level of subsidies resulted in inefficiencies in the airline industry and 
further forced governments at all levels to inject more money into the industry. Privatisation 
is likely to ease the government’s burden and foster a competitive airline industry without 
any expense to the taxpayer. 
Following the removal of excessive and inappropriate controls by CAAC, an examination of 
the performance of China’s airlines would be an interesting research topic. On the one hand 
 a more deregulated environment means potentially stronger competition, but on the other 
hand increased concentration resulting from the 2002 consolidation might pose a threat to 
competition, especially in the absence of an effective antitrust law. However, this is beyond 
the scope of this paper. In the following sections, we seek to refute the argument that China’s 
2002 airline consolidation is an arranged marriage, with CAAC being the controlling partner 
that has overruled the wishes of the merging parties. Later sections of this paper will show 
that this argument is not completely true. A careful study of China’s civil aviation evolution 
and the consolidation process demonstrates that consolidation is a natural solution to the 
problems facing China’s airlines, and is not merely a result of government policy. 
3. Airline Consolidations 
3.1. Eliminating the Regional Airlines 
China’s first airline merger occurred in 1994 when Fujian Airlines, which had been in 
operation for just one year and operated only a few small Chinese-manufactured Yun-7 
aircraft, was taken over by Xiamen Airlines. Because these two airlines were both based in 
Fujian province, their merger had no real impact on either the China-wide industry or the 
economy. Several other small airlines that were in severe financial distress were taken over 
after 1997 with the onset of the Southeast Asian financial crisis. China General Aviation 
Corporation, headquartered in Taiyuan, Shanxi province, a city in northern China with few 
potential passengers, was absorbed by China Eastern Airlines. In 1998, China Eastern 
incorporated China Great Wall Airlines, which was based in Ningbo, a city near Shanghai. It 
was difficult for these small airlines to survive in the shadow of the trunk airlines, especially 
those that were based in relatively less-developed cities. Such also was the fate of Wuhan 
Airlines, which seemed unable to recover from a fatal accident in 2000 and was acquired by 
China Eastern two years later. In this way, China Eastern extended its base territory from 
East China to two northern provinces, Shanxi and Hebei, where China General Aviation 
Corporation was based, and to the central province of Hubei, the home of Wuhan Airlines. 
For similar reasons, China Southern acquired Guizhou Airlines and Zhongyuan Airlines in 
1998 and 2000 respectively. The home provinces of these two airlines were also the base 
areas of China Southern. However, other local airlines based in the relatively developed 
coastal areas were in a better position. Two reasonably efficient regional airlines, Shenzhen 
Airlines and Hainan Airlines, which compete with China Southern in their overlapped areas, 
have not been so easy to eliminate. Shanghai Airlines and Shandong Airlines are in the same 
 situation, challenging the monopoly status of China Eastern within its backyard. The 
ambitious Hainan Airlines took over Chang’an Airlines and China Xinhua Airlines in 2000 
and 2001, enabling it to service a nationwide network. 
In fact, the regional airlines generally did not play on a level field with the trunk airlines. 
Their lifelines were the routes that link Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which overlap 
with those of the big three—Air China, China Eastern and China Southern. Their heavy 
losses that resulted from the cutthroat competition in the price wars could not be constantly 
funded by their shareholders, mainly the respective local governments. However, the trunk 
airlines could still operate with the support of the central government that would not let them 
go bankrupt. In addition, their lack of experience and trained staff forced the regional 
carriers to consolidate with the trunk airlines. But what will be the fates of the unprofitable 
trunk airlines such as China Northern and China Northwest? Will the central government 
continue to pour money into them with no promise of a return? The answer might be to treat 
them the same as the inefficient regional carriers: eliminate them through mergers. 
3.2. Consolidating into the Big Three 
After the signing of an agreement, the merging of groups of China’s airlines was declared on 
11 October 2002. The merger resulted in three major airline groups, with a few remaining 
independent airlines (see Table 1). Air China Group was a consolidation of Air China 
(Beijing), China Southwest (Chengdu) and CNAC.
17
 China Southern Group was formed 
from China Southern Airlines (Guangzhou), China Northern Airlines (Shenyang) and China 
Xinjiang Airlines (Urumqi). The China Eastern Group included China Eastern Airlines 
(Shanghai), China Yunnan Airlines (Kunming) and China Northwest Airlines (Xi’an). By 
the end of 2002, the big three consolidated airlines—China Southern Group, China Eastern 
Group and Air China Group—commanded 34%, 24% and 21% of the passenger market, and 
29%, 24% and 28% of the cargo market, respectively (international traffic included). After 
taking over several regional airlines such as Chang’an, Xinhua and Shanxi, Hainan Airline 
Group ranked fourth, with 8% of the passenger market and 4% of the cargo market by the 
end of 2002 (Source: China Civil Aviation Statistics 2003). Table 1 lists the airlines left in 
                                                 
17
 CNAC: China National Aviation Corporation, owned by CAAC and based in Hong Kong (but not directly 
providing air services to and from Hong Kong), was a major shareholder of Dragon Air and Air Macau, with 
a small subsidiary, Zhejiang Airlines, providing services to and from Zhejiang province. 
 China’s domestic market after the mergers, and their headquarters. The carrier code for each 
airline is given in parentheses following the airline’s name. 
There was much speculation about possible mergers before the consolidations were 
announced. China Economic Times (11/09/2000) and Southern Metropolis Daily 
(29/09/2000) reported that Air China and China Southern Airlines had signed an 
intention-to-merge agreement, but that this was vetoed by CAAC in early 1999, even though 
this voluntary consolidation was acceptable to the State Council (Yu and Yuan 2002). Yu 
and Yuan also claim that China Eastern proposed that if Air China and China Southern’s 
plan was allowed, it would seek to ally itself with three other trunk airlines (China Northern, 
China Northwest and China Southwest). Although these actions have been circulated and 
discussed within the industry,
18
 CAAC has never formally confirmed them. 
It is highly possible that Air China and China Southern did have this intention, given that 
they have compatible aircraft fleets (mainly Boeing aircraft), and Air China has a 
competitive advantage in the international market while China Southern owns the most 
extensive domestic network. Their proposals might have been rejected because, with their 
supplementary advantages, the merged airlines would have been too dominant in China’s 
airline industry. Objections from other airlines might also be a major reason. Whatever the 
reason, this shows that after two years of price wars the trunk airlines themselves considered 
merging, rather than, as some people believed, that CAAC forced them to do so. At this point 
the only question for each airline was, who would be their most suitable partner? 
It was CAAC that exercised its authority by deciding that Air China, China Eastern and 
China Southern should remain after the mergers. This is not surprising as these three were in 
many respects the top performers among the trunk airlines: financial status, reputation, 
management skill and, possibly most importantly, each was headquartered at one of China’s 
most important cities—Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, respectively. However, CAAC 
could not arrange everything because its authority was weakened when it lost control over 
airfares. For example, which airline was to join which group was largely left to the airlines 
through discussions and bargaining. The negotiations, as reported by Xiao (2001), usually 
followed the pattern of CAAC making suggestions first, and then the particular individual 
carriers discussing and assessing the feasibility of the suggestions. Any disagreements were 
aired until a compromise solution, still subject to the approval of the State Council, was 
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 formulated. Therefore, China’s airline consolidations were more than an arranged marriage. 
In fact, although it cannot be denied that CAAC played an important role in the process of 
consolidation, CAAC has repeatedly claimed that the mergers between the airlines followed 
the wills of the individual companies, with only guidance coming from the government 
(Wang and Cheng 2001). 
Even after CAAC had decided that the major three airlines would remain as the cornerstones 
of the aviation industry, lengthy negotiations took place among the airlines to decide which 
carriers should be included in each group. It can be imagined that there were many stories 
behind this lengthy process. People immediately connected the arranged code-share 
agreement between China Southern and Yunnan Airlines, on the route from Guangzhou to 
Kunming from 1 March 2001, to the approaching consolidation (Li 2001). Because it had 
been profitable for many years, Yunnan Airlines was a welcome partner because of its 
monopoly status within Yunnan province. In contrast, the heavily indebted China Northwest 
was not regarded as a suitable partner. The final result—combining China Eastern, Yunnan 
Airlines and China Northwest, thus selling a good with a bad—was obviously a compromise 
reached behind closed doors. Possibly for a similar reason, China Southern, Xinjiang, a 
monopolist within Xinjiang province, and China Northern, an ill-managed airline with many 
old MD aircraft, were grouped together through the negotiation. This arrangement ensured 
that neither group had an absolute advantage over the other following the mergers, which 
seems to be an acceptable outcome for all parties. As mentioned earlier, CNAC only had a 
small subsidiary, Zhejiang Airlines, providing services in the domestic market, which is 
small in scale. Therefore, compared with the other two groups, the Air China group had a 
relatively small presence in domestic markets. However, considering that Air China, the flag 
carrier with the most extensive international networks, has the highest reputation in many 
respects, the overall competitiveness of the Air China Group can provide a competitively 
effective constraint on the other two groups. 
The three newly established groups are not only balanced in size and capacity, but are also 
spatially balanced with respect to geographical space. The home cities of group members in 
all three groups form an interesting triangle in the map of China. For example, in the Air 
China Group, the home bases of the three members lie in the north (Beijing), east 
(Hangzhou) and southwest (Chengdu), respectively; in the China Eastern Group, Shanghai, 
Xi’an and Kunming are located in China’s east, northwest and southwest, respectively; the 
China Southern Group includes a base in the northeast (Shenyang), northwest (Urumqi) and 
 south (Guangzhou), respectively. Each group possesses a gateway city and inland hubs, 
giving them enough space to expand, and equal opportunity to redesign their operational 
networks to build up competitiveness. The spatial balance implies that a direct consequence 
of the mergers would be greatly enhanced multimarket contacts among each group. The big 
three airlines would compete in a much broader market than ever before. 
The declaration of the mergers on 11 October 2002 was only the beginning of a long and 
tortuous integration process. It is difficult to pinpoint when the full integration of each airline 
group in terms of their schedules, service, assets and manpower coordination was achieved. 
It likely did not take long for the airlines in a group to jointly set fares and schedules and 
jointly share airport facilities and maintenance services. For example, the carrier codes and 
logos were unified at the beginning of 2003 for each group. The ticketing offices and airport 
staff across the country of each group gradually merged from the second half of 2003. 
Merging the assets of the airlines into the publicly listed China Eastern and China Southern 
took much longer and was not accomplished until mid-2005.
19
 After consolidating the 
assets of the acquired airlines, Air China listed its shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
and the London Stock Exchange on 15 December, 2004. 
4.  Forces Driving the Consolidations 
4.1. A General Overview of the reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions 
There are three types of mergers: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate (Asch 1983). When 
one company merges all or part of the stock or assets of another company that directly 
competes against the acquirer in the same product line or in the same geographic area, the 
merger is horizontal; a vertical merger occurs when the participating companies are in a 
supplier–customer relationship; a merger that does not fall into these two categories and that 
is usually associated with market extension or product extension activities is conglomerate. 
The China airline mergers are mainly horizontal mergers, but they are also associated with 
extended networks after the mergers, which have some elements of conglomerate mergers. 
Each merger case has its own motives. A complex pattern of motives might exist for a single 
merger case. However, there are some general motives that most mergers and acquisitions 
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Eastern Group, were financially independent. This was also the case for the members of the other two airline 
groups. 
 have, and after a discussion of these we will move on to the facts and numbers to infer the 
motives of China’s airline consolidations. 
The managerial literature has voluminous discussions of the motives for mergers and 
acquisitions. Trautwein (1990) surveys the theories of merger motives. Seven groups of 
motives are established: efficiency or synergy theory, monopoly theory, valuation theory, 
empire-building theory, process theory, raider theory, and disturbance theory. 
Similar types of motives were summarised by Bekovitch and Narayanan (1993): the synergy 
motive, the agency motive, and hubris. Other motives, such as diversification and tax 
considerations, are also possible. However, Mukherjee et al. (2004), by conducting direct 
investigations among the decision makers, find that the usual primary motivation for 
mergers and acquisitions is to achieve operating synergies. Andrade et al. (2001) provide a 
possible motive that is highly relevant to our case. They contend that deregulation and the 
resulting industry shock that it caused became a dominant factor in merger activity in the US 
in the 1990s. 
Apart from the above motives, researchers into airline consolidations, notably the airline 
alliances, have identified a series of particular benefits that may become the dominant 
motives for merging airlines: greater ability to overcome regulating restrictions; cost 
reductions and economies of scale, scope and density; coordinated schedules and prices to 
optimise the demand for each flight with improved service quality; and opportunities to 
reshape industry structure and to raise barriers against new entrants (Oum and Park 1997; 
Oum et al. 2000; Goh and Uncles 2003). 
In a previous section, we described the ―chaos‖ in airline markets (so-called by many airline 
people) in terms of the repeated irrational pricing behaviour.
20
 Being unable to re-regulate 
pricing, CAAC resorted to guiding the airlines into consolidation. The desire of the 
government constituted one of the many forces that drove the mergers. However, it was not 
only the wish of CAAC to end the ―unnecessary‖ competition. Airlines also sought the 
consolidations because, as will be seen shortly through figures and facts, outside pressure 
together with financial difficulties had forced them to consider mergers. Seeking synergies 
or market power might have also been a motive, but it should be understood that the motives 
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with the nature of the markets in which they operate. It could be that the institutional structure of the markets is 
irrational, rather than the behaviour of the airlines. 
 inferred by outsiders, or even the real motives of the participants, may not be necessarily 
realised and become the anticipated results. 
4.2. A World Trend—Airline Mergers and Airline Alliances 
In the US from 1966 to 1980, horizontal mergers were not usually permitted if the resulting 
firm would control more than 15% of the market (Shepherd and Shepherd 2004). The 
Reagan administration then loosened this antitrust policy as long as the merger would lead to 
improved efficiency, unleashing a spate of mergers in the 1980s. In fact, economic history 
shows that mergers and acquisitions occur in waves (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). Also in 
the late 1980s, in Canada six carriers merged into Canadian Airlines, creating a duopolistic 
domestic market with Air Canada. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw an additional wave of 
consolidations, between, for example, Air Canada and Canadian Airlines, American Airlines 
and TWA, and Japan Airlines and Japan Air Systems. More recently, a cross-border 
acquisition occurred between Air France and KLM. 
China’s airline mergers took place in the setting of this new wave of international 
consolidation. In addition, the international competitive advantages of the US carriers had 
been strengthened by the mergers. Clougherty (2000) argues that domestic airline mergers 
increase international efficiency via the enhancement of domestic networks and via the 
elimination of domestic competition. Therefore, international competitive incentives can be 
an additional spur to domestic airline mergers. To gain a similar international competitive 
advantage was one of the main driving forces behind the Chinese government’s airline 
consolidation policy. The merging parties believed that they were participating in a 
worldwide trend and hoped that consolidation would rapidly increase their efficiency, 
improving their ability to counter their foreign rivals. 
4.3. The Formation of Hub-and-Spoke Networks to achieve Cost Savings 
Although China’s total air traffic ranked at number four in the world measured in 
passenger–km terms and number five in tonne–km terms in 2002, compared with other 
major international airlines, the scale of China’s three main airlines is still small, whether in 
terms of the size of the fleet, passenger–km or tonne–km (data source: China Civil Aviation 
Statistics (2003). No Chinese airline appeared in the top 30 lists before 2002. Thus, 
economies of scale, scope and density most likely were not achieved prior to the 
consolidations. 
 China faces the problem of how to develop a hub-and-spoke system in place of the ―linear‖ 
point-to-point structure, thereby creating a wave of arrivals followed by a wave of 
departures at a hub for the connecting passengers, which were well developed in the US 
following airline deregulation. More than 20 years after China opened its door to the outside 
world, many overseas Chinese and foreigners still found it inconvenient to fly on to inland 
cities from Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou because of the lack of suitable connecting 
flights. Also, according to the then airline timetables, passengers travelling between the two 
medium-sized cities of Zhengzhou and Qingdao, which in 2002 were connected by only five 
flights a week, had to travel by train or bus between the two cities if they missed their flight 
and did not want to wait for the next flight on another day. However, now, by carefully 
designing their flight schedules, this inconvenience can be avoided. Schedules permit 
international and domestic passengers to seamlessly travel to their final destinations via the 
hubs without the need to change to another carrier or a lengthy wait in the transfer lounge. 
Airline schedules also allow passengers to travel between Zhengzhou and Qingdao via a 
transfer at one of the hub cities, say, Beijing or Shanghai, where there are many flights each 
day to these two medium-sized cities. 
In fact, building a hub-and-spoke network is not only a supplier-driven strategy to maximise 
capacity to accommodate more passengers so as to achieve economies of scope and density. 
It is also driven by the needs of consumers. In general, an airline becomes more attractive to 
frequent flyers if it serves a large number of destinations. Consolidation has made this 
possible. Each of the three groups forms a big triangle, which gives them the opportunity to 
change the ways that they provide services. 
4.4. The Search for Improved Financial Performance 
Nearly all the major US airlines experienced substantial change from a position of high 
profit to heavy losses in their financial performance in the three years following the passage 
of the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act (Williams 1994). This led to the development of a 
series of activities in a bid to increase competitiveness, including the development of 
computer reservation systems, frequent flyer programmes, code-sharing alliances, and even 
mergers. An amazingly similar story was repeated in China following the relaxation of 
 airfares in 1997, including consolidation, which was a strategy that the Chinese airlines were 
compelled to take when facing financial difficulties.
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We first provide some informative data that gives an overview of China’s air transport 
development since China opened its door. Table 2 reports data on air traffic volume over the 
period 1980–2002 in the domestic market. The data from the mid-1980s suggest that the 
government’s policies and reform measures in the second stage had a strong impact on 
industry growth. After the rapid growth in the first half of the 1990s, with an average annual 
increase of 27%, the late 1990s saw a slowdown in passenger traffic growth. Growth then 
accelerated from 2000, with a growth rate of more than 10% each year. It is worth noting that 
cargo and mail traffic kept growing at a fast pace, with an annual growth rate not less than 
15% between 1990 and 2000. It seems that China’s airlines performed very well if we look 
only at the traffic that they carried, reflecting the strong growth in the economy in China 
since the 1980s. However, these indicators of traffic volume reveal nothing about the 
profitability of the airlines. 
Table 3 shows that the total revenue of the whole industry greatly increased during the past 
two decades. Narrowing the focus to the most recent decade shows that 1997 is a turning 
point. With the relaxed control over airfares in 1997, total revenue from all civil aviation 
immediately dropped by 10% in 1997 from 48 billion Chinese yuan (US$6 billion) in 1997 
to 43 billion (US$5.4 billion) in 1998, though Table 2 suggests that total traffic turnover 
increased by 12.6% (in tonne–km) in this period. The revenue from international markets 
slid (by 15%) more than that from the domestic market (by 6.2%), indicating mounting 
pressure from international rivals. The decrease in revenue led to the call for price 
re-regulation in 1999, as mentioned earlier. As a result of ensuing intervention, civil aviation 
revenues from the domestic market saw a moderate increase, by 6.6% in 1999 and 9.3% in 
2000. 
A bigger increase in 2001 and 2002 from the domestic market might suggest the success of 
the ―revenue pooling‖ scheme. However, it should be understood that this only indicates 
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 success for the whole industry, not for every individual airline. Also, it only suggests a win 
in the short run, not necessarily being in the best interests of the industry in the long run, as 
all of China was undergoing the transformation towards a market economy, in which every 
industry had to be prepared to embrace a new free market sooner or later. This scheme was 
eventually abandoned when CAAC realised that this was not the right way to keep this 
industry profitable. However, after abandoning the scheme and with no other effective 
remedies that could satisfy all the relevant parties, consolidation seemed to be a natural 
choice. Consolidation may bring about some harmful effects, but they are not so immediate 
and in many cases not so controversial. 
China’s airline industry had a notorious safety record in the 1990s.22 Yet, for the 
state-owned airlines, safety rather than profit had been the main concern. The US experience 
has demonstrated that neither deregulation nor the increased financial hazards has had an 
effect on the safety of airline travel (Rose 1989; Foreman 1993; Adrangi et al. 1997). In 
China, there has been a decline in air traffic accidents since deregulation. However, many 
people in China’s airline industry still have the same perception as described in Adrangi et 
al. (1997) for the US case, namely that the eroded profits following deregulation will force 
airlines to scrimp on aircraft maintenance and air crew training. There was also concern 
about overuse of the airlines’ resources (e.g., overtime for aircrew) by increasing the 
frequency of flights and operating new routes with no oversight when route entry and exit 
has been liberalised. For these reasons, China’s aviation authority was wary of every step of 
reform, and tended to be conservative and indecisive at times. For many years the question, 
―which should be put first, safety or profit‖ was undebatable for many government officials, 
who undoubtedly put safety first. Therefore, it is not surprising that airlines were not being 
pushed too much for profits and as a result subsidies had to be paid to the state-owned 
airlines whenever they made losses. However, with the ongoing privatisation of many once 
wholly state-owned airlines and decreased subsidies from the government, pursuit of profits 
to maximise the market value of the company has become the ultimate goal. However, at the 
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and Baotou 2004. 
 same time, safety should not be compromised. In these circumstances, consolidation seems 
to be a promising means through which the carriers can achieve both goals.
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Another performance indicator is the load factor, which measures the percentage of 
available seating capacity that is filled with passengers. Looking at Tables 4 to 6, both the 
passenger load factor and the weight load factor of the whole industry decreased greatly after 
1997. The individual airline data demonstrate the same result for all the trunk airlines and 
most of the regional airlines. Tables 4–6 give rise to the question, why did the load factors 
not improve after the airlines were allowed to sell discount tickets? 
Table 7 may in part answer this question. It illustrates that there was a jump in the total 
number of aircraft from 1991 to 1993, mainly resulting from purchases by the newly 
established regional airlines. The main type of aircraft purchased by these small airlines 
was the Boeing 737 series. While it seems that from 1993 to 1997 the total number of 
aircraft remained relatively steady, during this period, many Russian- and Chinese-made 
small aircraft were retired. The major airlines introduced large aircraft with more than 200 
seats that were generally considered much safer. This may be the principal reason for the 
decrease in load factors since 1997, leading to strong competition to fill up the aircraft and 
eventually to the heavy losses in their financial reports. 
The Chinese government has the final say in purchasing aircraft from Boeing, Airbus and 
other manufacturers, and for political reasons, aircraft purchases must be balanced between 
the two major manufacturers. Because of this, many of China’s airlines have a very diverse 
fleet, which increases their training and maintenance costs. A merger can enable members 
of one group to better deploy their aircraft because of a more extensive network. Some 
surplus or unsuitable planes for one member of the group may be better utilised by another 
member on another route. Thus, both members operate more efficiently and higher load 
factors may be achieved. Aircraft utilisation is also likely to be increased. 
It should be noted that most of the empirical studies have shown that horizontal mergers on 
average are not associated with higher profitability (see the survey by Jacquemin and Slade 
1989), but this presumption still remains in favour of many mergers, especially for firms that 
are faced with financial difficulties. Empirical evidence suggests that poorly run firms are 
seen as takeover targets as they wish to avoid bankruptcy (De Bondt and Thompson 1992; 
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 Matsusaka 1993). Shrieves and Stevens (1979) argue that some failing firms find the cost of 
merging less than the cost of bankruptcy. Porter (1990) regarded alliances as a transitional 
device and as a response to uncertainty about the future, especially for firms experiencing 
structural change or facing unprecedented competition. Doganis (2006) also holds this view 
and contends that more large international airline alliances or mergers will be created in the 
coming years as a result. For example, a cross-country airline alliance (joint venture) 
occurred in 1993 when KLM acquired Northwest Airlines, which was in financial trouble 
(Tully 1996). The proposed strategic alliance between Qantas and Air New Zealand, and the 
acquisition of a substantial equity investment by Qantas in Air New Zealand also came at a 
time of poor performance by Air New Zealand.
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 All these facts indicate that it was an 
appropriate time for the poorly performing Chinese airlines to consolidate. 
4.5. Outside Shocks 
Outside shocks might have prompted the airline mergers. There is no doubt that the onset 
of the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997 (see Chin et al. 1999 for discussion) and the 
September 11 tragedy in the US had a profound influence on the airline industry (see Ito 
and Lee 2005 for an assessment). As a result of the sharp decrease in demand in the 
international market after these events, the airlines had to curtail their international flights 
and transfer capacity to the domestic market. This consequently intensified domestic 
competition, which called for restructuring in the airline industry. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the evolution of China’s airline industry with an emphasis on the 
deregulation stage after which the airline consolidations occurred, and the reasons why they 
happened. In spite of a chequered process in deregulation, further deregulation has since 
been pushed forward in China’s airline industry with further privatisation, easier entry and 
exit, and easier investment into aviation businesses. 
With a brief review of the theories and empirical findings relating to the motives for mergers 
and acquisitions, and a discussion of the facts of China’s airline industry following the 
airfare deregulation in 1997, we have sought to establish the most likely reasons for China’s 
airline consolidations. Although the results of the existing empirical work are largely 
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 inconclusive owing to the simultaneous existence of multiple motives, as noted by 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), it seems that a worldwide consolidating trend, outside 
pressure posed by competitive foreign airlines, the pursuit of cost savings through a large 
network, and the financial difficulties facing the carriers, might be the primary drivers that 
led to the 2002 consolidations of China’s airlines. 
Worldwide, airlines have been constantly adjusting to the ever-changing and deregulated 
environment. Fundamental changes have also taken place in China since 1997 when 
deregulation started. The evolution of China’s airline industry in the post-deregulation 
period appears to have much in common with the US, where lower airfares immediately 
followed deregulation, a spate of mergers occurred in the years after deregulation, and 
hub-and-spoke networks quickly developed to achieve the greater efficiency required to 
meet the stronger competition brought about by deregulation. 
Also similar is that almost all the airline mergers in the US in the 1980s were allowed to go 
ahead without serious opposition from the US antitrust authorities. China’s airline 
consolidation also occurred without any antitrust challenge owing to the lack of effective 
antitrust laws. However, one difference is that there has been much literature examining 
almost every aspect of the evolution of the US airline industry after deregulation, including 
the actual effects of the 1980s mergers, while only a few serious academic studies have been 
carried out on the evolution of China’s airline industry, not to mention the assessment of 
their possible anticompetitive effects. This should be a future research area. 
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Table 1  
Airlines remaining in China’s domestic market after 2003a 
Airlines (or groups) remaining in the 
domestic market 
Group members and merger time Headquarters  
Air China Group (CNAC Holdings) 
Air China (CA)  10/2002 Beijing  
China Southwest (SZ)  10/2002 Chengdu 
CNAC (F6)  10/2002 Hangzhou 
China Eastern Group (China Eastern 
Holdings)
 
China Eastern (MU)  10/2002 Shanghai 
China Northwest (WH) 10/2002 Xi’an 
China Yunnan (3Q)  10/2002 Kunming 
Wuhan Airlines (WU)   08/2002 Wuhan 
China Southern Group (China Southern 
Holdings)
b 
China Southern (CZ)  10/2002 Guangzhou 
China Northern (CJ)  10/2002 Shenyang 
China Xinjiang (XO)  10/2002 Urumqi 
Hainan Group (or Hainan Holdings) 
Hainan Airlines (HU) Haikou 
China Xinhua (X2)  02/2001 
Tianjin & 
Beijing 
 Chang’an Airlines (2Z) 08/2000 Xi’an 
Shan’xi Airlines (8C)   07/2001  
Shanghai Airlines (FM)  Shanghai 
Xiamen Airlines (MF)  Xiamen 
Sichuan Airlines (3U)  Chengdu 
Shenzhen Airlines (ZH)  Shenzhen 
Shandong Airlines (SC)  
Jinan & 
Qingdao 
a 
This Table does not contain the low-cost airlines, which were established after 2005. Nor does it contain the 
airlines that had been taken over before 2000. 
b
 Although China Southern has investments in Xiamen Airlines (MF) and Sichuan Airlines (3U), it does not 
appear to intervene in their internal affairs to any great extent. The two airlines have formed their own 
identities and images. Passengers generally do not regard them as members of China Southern Group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Traffic volume in China's domestic airline market, 1980–2002 
Year 
Passenger Traffic 
(10,000) 
Turnover 
Volume of 
Passenger 
(10,000–km) 
Cargo and Mail 
Traffic (tonne) 
Turnover 
Volume of 
Cargo & Mail 
(10,000 
tonne–km) 
Total Traffic 
Turnover 
(10,000 
tonne–km) 
1980  293  280,904  68,591  7,395  27,671 
1985  595  706,212  134,242  16,405  67,423 
1986  831  1,000,899  155,809  19,611  91,901 
1987  1,109  1,327,026  211,557  26,836  122,382 
1988  1,171  1,431,733  225,987  29,841  132,926 
1989  1,052  1,271,092  207,446  27,989  119,506 
1990  1,346  1,576,561  239,467  31,646  145,157 
1991  1,797  2,117,406  288,961  37,803  190,329 
1992  2,394  2,944,009  369,681  49,504  260,459 
1993  2,805  3,517,912  441,896  60,606  312,621 
1994  3,445  4,193,544  565,202  77,515  377,595 
1995  4,419  5,287,232  702,557  96,604  474,660 
1996  4,782  5,731,759  821,556  114,190  540,717 
1997
a,b 
 5,112  6,088,820  953,870  134,759  587,698 
 1998  5,204  6,228,104  1,081,655  153,684  661,686 
1999
 
 5,463  6,516,727  1,280,552  182,033  666,638 
2000  6,031  7,377,283  1,474,767  211,133  759,818 
2001  6,832  8,463,034  1,354,019  196,090  951,550 
2002  7,756  9,719,845  1,595,299  232,451  1,100,647 
a
 Hong Kong included since 1997, Macau included since 1999. 
b
 1997 onwards is regarded as a deregulated period and therefore is highlighted in bold. 
Source: China Civil Aviation Statistics (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 
Revenue of China’s airline industry, 1980–2002 (in 10,000 yuan) 
Year 
 
Revenue of Civil Aviation 
General Aviation 
Revenue 
Airport Service 
Revenue Other Revenue 
Total Revenue Per 
ton-km 
Total Revenue 
 
International Market 
Revenue 
Domestic Market 
Revenue Total      
1980        11,524.00      25,502.00   37,026.00   3,936.00   3,908.00  0.84  178.00   45,049.00  
1981        19,058.00       27,760.00   46,817.00   3,562.00        4,186.00  0.87      1,628.00   56,194.00  
1982        25,319.00      30,754.00   56,072.00   4,034.00        5,104.00  0.88     1,691.00   66,900.00  
1983       47,585.00      30,858.00   78,443.00   5,473.00        6,329.00  1.18      2,719.00   92,964.00  
1984      66,746.00      46,402.00   113,148.00   7,867.00        7,458.00  1.23      2,166.00   130,632.00  
1985      112,629.00      72,531.00   185,160.00   7,506.00        8,451.00  1.48     15,539.00   209,150.00  
1986      152,818.00     102,968.00   255,786.00   5,982.00       11,861.00  1.77    14,833.00   282,435.00  
1987      208,493.00     156,189.00   364,682.00   6,562.00       43,907.00  1.97    18,331.00   426,920.00  
1988      265,198.00     222,136.00      487,334.00        6,518.00       60,801.00  2.23     18,863.00   566,998.00  
1989      233,960.00     263,526.00      497,486.00        6,448.00       71,291.00  2.46    22,322.00   591,099.00  
1990      368,698.00     407,720.00      776,418.00       7,302.00       54,831.00  3.16    13,434.00      844,683.00  
1991     513,521.00     552,533.00    1,066,054.00        6,806.00       94,201.00  3.42    17,312.00   1,177,567.00  
1992      661,093.00     841,658.00   1,502,751.00        7,448.00     156,045.00  3.58    15,474.00   1,681,718.00  
1993      851,285.00   1,100,163.00   1,951,448.00       8,908.00    195,193.00  4.04   152,279.00   2,307,828.00  
1994    1,360,199.00   1,698,156.00   3,058,355.00       12,359.00    212,233.00  5.54   220,395.00   3,278,750.00  
1995   1,570,542.00   2,231,150.00   3,856,006.00       16,183.00    284,530.00  5.63   192,860.00   4,349,579.00  
1996   1,637,253.00   2,782,793.00   4,476,927.00       16,175.00    328,747.00  5.66   230,695.00   5,052,544.00  
1997   1,840,748.00   2,930,331.00   4,817,399.00       15,224.00    371,182.00  6.57   322,400.00   5,526,205.00  
1998   1,556,411.00   2,747,524.00   4,338,815.00       8,493.00    420,249.00  5.70   316,258.00    5,083,815.00  
1999   1,841,205.00   2,928,206.00   4,805,867.00       10,053.00    443,639.00  5.75  1,046,750.00    6,306,309.00  
2000   2,045,159.00   3,200,603.00   5,281,285.00       10,212.00    526,063.00  5.48  1,287,721.00   7,105,282.00  
2001   2,058,981.00   3,572,549.00   5,666,683.00       12,508.00    685,724.00  5.50  2,414,361.00   8,779,275.00  
2002  2,646,919.00   5,680,933.00   8,368,058.00       13,265.00   1,925,805.00  5.08  1,186,741.00   11,493,868.00  
Source: China’s Civil Aviation Statistics (1949–2000) (2002) and Hong Kong CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
 
 Table 4 
Passenger load factors and weight load factors 
Year Passenger load factors Weight load factors 
 
Average 
% 
Domestic 
Routes 
% 
Hong 
Kong & 
Macau 
Routes 
% 
Int’l 
routes 
% 
Average 
% 
Domestic 
Routes 
% 
Hong 
Kong & 
Macau 
Routes 
% 
Int’l 
routes 
% 
1986  78.1  89.7  67.1  60  64.5  72.3  59.3  55.4 
1987  78.2  89.5  68.3  59.6  66.1  74.7  59.7  56.5 
1988  79.6  89.2  72.4  64.4  67.2  75.7  60.5  58.3 
1989  68.1  78.5  62.9  51.4  59.5  67.4  56.8  50.7 
1990  68.9  76.9  68.1  54  59.3  63.1  56.8  52.4 
1991  77  84.8  74.2  61.3  64.5  70.6  61.3  56.9 
1992  78.4  87.1  78.3  59.3  64.6  69.6  60.4  57.9 
1993  71.8  76.6  69.2  57.5  58.4  59.9  52.4  56.8 
1994  69  73.5  56.3  57.3  56.8  58.4  44.9  55.9 
1995  71.5  75.9  57.8  59.6  58.8  59.9  45.6  59.2 
1996  69.3  72.4  57  61.7  59.2  60.1  45.2  59.7 
1997
a 
 65  66.4  41.2  60.9  57.1  55.5  34.4  61 
1998  59.3  60.1  58.2  56.5  53.3  51.4  48  57.5 
1999  58.6  57.6  61.7  56.3  55.6  51.3  64.6  49.6 
a 
Hong Kong routes included in domestic routes after 1997, Macau routes included in domestic routes after 1999. 
Source: China’s Civil Aviation Statistics (1949–2000) (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 
Passenger load factors of trunk airlines 
Year Air China 
China 
Southern 
Airlines 
China 
Eastern 
Airlines 
China 
Northern 
Airlines 
China 
Southwest 
Airline 
China 
Northwes
t Airline 
Yunnan 
Airlines 
Xinjiang 
Airlines 
 % % % % % % % % 
1985 68.3 90.7 76.3 92.6 88.9 91.7   
1986 76.4 91.7 73.4 89.8 87.4 90.2  85.6 
1987 68.2 91.6 77.6 91.7 89.4 86.4  79.7 
1988 70.2 89.6 82.2 89.5 87.7 85.6 95.3 93.4 
1989 56.9 78 71.3 78.6 73.6 74.2 84.3 82.2 
1990 58.9 78.7 73.3 71.5 74.1 72.4 89.4 75.5 
1991 66.9 84.4 80.3 80.4 82.6 81.9 87.9 88.4 
1992 71.3 86.3 71.3 84.7 83.9 82.7 88.4 86.4 
1993 64.7 75.8 73.9 73.3 74.6 71.5 79.3 74.8 
1994 63.4 70.4 69.1 70.6 72.6 65.5 83.7 76.0 
1995 65.4 72.5 69.5 76.5 76 65.1 84.3 76.9 
1996 66 70.9 65.8 73.6 69.6 65.5 77.4 72.7 
1997 64.2 64.2 64.4 66.1 65.6 61.6 66.1 66.9 
1998 59.6 60.9 58.8 55.1 57.6 54.1 61.8 58.4 
1999 61.4 58.5 58.9 54.9 56.1 56.9 65.6 58.3 
2000 64.1 60.4 62.4 59.5 56.4 62.3 56.5 59.9 
2001 63.9 62.3 61.5 59.9 56.6 58.9 59.5 58.3 
2002 68.2 65.4 65.0 60.3 59.7 57.0 60.8 45.8 
2003 65.9 63.6 59.5 65.3    64.6 
Source: China’s Civil Aviation Statistics (1949–2000) (2002); data after 1999 from Hong Kong CEIC Data Company 
Ltd. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6 
Passenger load factors of regional airlines 
Year 
Shanghai 
Airlines 
Hainan 
Airlines 
Sichuan 
Airlines 
Shenzhen 
Airlines 
Xinhua 
Airlines
a 
Shandong 
Airlines 
 % % % % % % 
1993 73.7 76.4 71.1 63.5 32.6  
1994 67.7 73.3 67.1 64.7 56.0  
1995 73.4 77.4 72.2 72.3 70.4 18.9 
1996 70.9 71.0 67.3 77.2 70.0 69.6 
1997 64.8 72.7 66.7 71.5 61.8 71.5 
1998 63.0 67.1 62.3 67.7 55.2 63.1 
1999 58.0 60.6 56.5 56.9 55.3 65.0 
2000 62.5 66.5 60.9 57.8 57.3 67.4 
2001 65.3 70.8 67.3 63.5 57.8 66.6 
2002 65.2 72.5 66.9 65.0 63.0 72.2 
2003 61.7 69.1 65.8 76.0 69.4 75.0 
a 
Xinhua Airlines was taken over by Hainan in 2001, but the statistic here was calculated separately. 
Source: China’s Civil Aviation Statistics (1949–2000) (2002); data after 1999 from Hong Kong CEIC Data Company 
Ltd. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7 
Aircraft owned by airlines 
Year Total 
Air 
China 
China 
Southern 
China 
Eastern 
China 
Southwest 
China 
Northwest 
China 
Northern 
Others 
1991 417 50  80  68 23 31 86  79 
1992 602 58  89  66 33 42 92  222 
1993 710 61  101  67 35 42 87  317 
1994 719 64  100  64 41 40 85  325 
1995 722 60  99  69 42 39 92  321 
1996 745 61  95  71 39 34 93  352 
1997 770 66  96  67 39 38 91  373 
1998 778 65  111  103 42 34 77  346 
1999 795 59  113  83 36 33 82  389 
2000 795 65  117  80 33 34 76  390 
2001 n/a 69  125  92 37 29 69  n/a 
Source: China’s Civil Aviation Statistics (1949–2000) (2002); data for 2001 from China Civil Aviation Statistics (2002). 
 
 
 
 
